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Abstract: This paper is, firstly, a reappraisal of the matching function, arguing that the 
proper specification of the relation between hirings (H), vacancies (V), and 
unemployment is the duration function, which shows how average recruitment times 
as measured by V/H depend on unemployment and other relevant variables. Secondly, 
indirect effects of longer recruitment times on employment through higher 
recruitment costs are studied by extending previous models to include both price 
formation and the distinction between vacancy costs and hiring costs. Thirdly, direct 
effects of longer recruitment times on employment through more unfilled jobs are 
explored and illustrated with data from Sweden since 2000 from a new business 
survey, which measures not only job vacancies but also unfilled jobs.   
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“In a world where economists have little certain knowledge, the shift of the U/V curve provides 
us with vital clues to the sources of the rise in unemployment. Large shifts indicate that a major 
part of the rise is due to changed behaviour of workers and employers in the filling of 
vacancies.” (Layard, Nickel, and Jackman 1991 p. 220) 
 
“Frictions have made important inroads in modern macroeconomics. In the labour market they 
are used to explain the existence of unemployment … . In the majority of cases, the modeling 
tool used to capture the influence of frictions on equilibrium outcomes is the aggregate 
matching function. … The matching function … occupies the same place in the 
macroeconomist’s tool kit as other aggregate functions, such as the production function and the 
demand for money function.” (Petrongolo and Pissarides 2001 pp. 390-91) 
 
“The search approach has led to a focus on dynamics in understanding the labor market. We 
now know quite a bit about these flows and their variation with regressors and across 
demographic groups. ‘Structural’ interpretation of these flows is more problematic. In the 
Markovian framework we are accustomed to, it is these flow rates that determine the 
equilibrium or natural unemployment rate. Policies affecting the flow rates are likely to have 
long-term effects; those focused on the stock at a particular period in time will have only short-
term effects. This notion has been crucial in the discussion of unemployment insurance policy 
and its effect on the natural rate of unemployment. Of course, the intuition leading to this 
generalization is based on Markovian (or semi-Markovian) models, and this specification is 




The matching function is a relation between hirings, vacancies, and unemployment, 
which reflects friction in job matching. The relation has been interpreted and 
estimated as a production function, with stocks of vacancies and unemployment as 
inputs and the number of hirings per period as output, first by Pissarides (1986), 
Blanchard and Diamond (1989), and Layard, Nickel and Jackman (1991), and then by 
many others, as the comprehensive survey by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) 
shows. 
  A shift of the matching function with fewer hirings at given inputs of vacancies 
and unemployment suggests a change of the matching technology which reduces the 
number of hirings per period, and which consequently also reduces the arrival rate of 
job offers which face the unemployed and increases unemployment by prolonging 
unemployment spells. 
  However, this flow approach to the effect of friction on unemployment is 
misleading. Friction in job matching does not affect unemployment directly, by 
prolonging unemployment spells, but indirectly, by reducing employment, as I shall 
argue in this paper.   2
  According to the dynamic theory of labour demand, the number of hirings per 
period chosen by a firm when hirings are instantaneous is in general determined by 
the firm’s desired net change of employment and its need to replace workers who, for 
various reasons, are leaving the firm. And the firm’s desired net change of 
employment depends on 1) current employment, 2) current sales, prices and costs 
(including recruitment costs), and 3) expectations of future sales, prices and costs, as 
elaborated, for instance, in Nickell (1986) or Hamermesh (1993). Thus, individual 
hirings, and hence also aggregate hirings, are functions of current and expected 
prices, sales and costs, including recruitment costs. 
  This is the established microfoundations of the dynamic theory of labour 
demand if hirings are instantaneous. How will the introduction of vacancies modify 
these foundations? 
  If all hirings were instantaneous there would be no vacancies as measured in 
vacancy surveys. We can consequently interpret the number of vacancies as a 
summary measure of friction in terms of deviations from instantaneous hirings. In 
fact, the vacancy rate was suggested as a measure of friction already in the seminal 
paper by Dow and Dicks-Mireaux (1958 p. 3), where a declining vacancy rate was 
interpreted as a fall in labour maladjustment. 
  Of course, controlling for hirings is preferable whenever information on hirings 
is available, since a high job vacancy rate may also be due to a rise in job turnover or 
job reallocation, as emphasized by, for instance, Thomson (1966 p. 191), Abraham 
(1987), and Blanchard and Diamond (1989). In fact, dividing the number of job 
vacancies (V) by the number of hirings per period (H), we obtain a measure of the 
average duration of recruitment. 
  In this paper I propose an analysis of the effect of friction on employment and 
hirings in three steps.  
  First, factors which create deviations from instantaneous hirings as measured by 
the average duration of recruitment are identified by estimating the duration function, 
that is, by regressing V/H on unemployment and other potentially important variables. 
  Second, indirect effects of longer recruitment times on employment and hirings 
through higher recruitment costs are analysed by extending previous models in Nickel 
(1986) and Pissarides (2000) to include price formation and the distinction between 
vacancy costs and hiring costs. We find that longer recruitment times reduce   3
employment if they raise recruitment costs so much that sales and employment are 
reduced by higher prices. We also find that longer recruitment times will raise the 
number of vacancies. Hirings are affected only if employment is affected. 
  Third, friction in job matching can reduce employment even if recruitment costs 
are negligible, namely by making the number of filled jobs (employees) less than the 
number of jobs, as elaborated in Section 5. This direct effect of friction on 
employment can only be identified by extending traditional vacancy surveys to 
include not only job vacancies but also unfilled jobs.    
  The paper is organized as follows. Job vacancies are defined and related to 
hirings in Section 2, observing that there are hirings without vacancies (probably 
many) as well as vacancies without hirings (probably few). In Section 3 measures of 
friction, including not only the rate of job vacancies and the average duration of job 
vacancies but also the rate of unfilled jobs, are illustrated with data from Sweden 
since 2000 from a new business survey. Indirect effects of longer recruitment times 
on employment through higher recruitment costs are analyzed in Section 4, while 
direct effects of longer recruitment times on employment through more unfilled jobs 
are discussed in Section 5.  Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Vacancies and hirings 
Some hirings are made more or less directly, for example, by recalling workers 
previously laid off or by offering jobs to spontaneous job applicants. In other cases 
there is no existing pool of job applicants which a firm can turn to. Instead the firm 
has to attract new job applicants by advertising its demand for personnel in 
newspapers or other media, by placing job orders with a public or private employment 
agency, or by contacting potential candidates directly. And then vacancies understood 
as ‘recruitment processes’ arise, as discussed in, e.g., van Ours and Ridder (1992) and 
Burdett and Cunningham (1998). 
  More precisely, a job vacancy begins when a firm starts to recruit a worker and 
it ends when a worker offered the job accepts it (or when recruiting is discontinued 
for other reasons). This is also the usual definition in vacancy surveys, including all 
the surveys discussed in NBER (1966), Muysken (1994), and Verhage et al. (1997).   4
 
2.1. Hirings without vacancies 
Can we assume that every hiring begins with a job vacancy? This assumption is 
implicitly made when attempts are made to estimate the total number of job vacancies 
(V) from the total number of hirings per period (H) and the average duration of job 
vacancies (T) for some part of the economy according to the formula 
(1)   V = HT, 
as in, for instance, Abraham (1983) and Jackman, Layard, and Pissarides (1989). In 
this context the assumption is true by definition. But in general it may be difficult to 
define and measure job vacancies for some types of hirings. 
  Suppose, for example, that a firm is so big that it has to hire 10 workers per 
month to replace a constant flow of 10 separations per month, and that each month the 
firm hires those ten applicants who contact the firm first (assuming they are properly 
qualified). Then it may be difficult for the firm to say when it started to recruit a 
particular worker, since it always has some recruitment activities going on. In other 
words, the firm may find it difficult to specify the number of ‘job vacancies’ it has on 
a particular day, but easy to specify the number of (desired) hirings per month. 
  Moreover, some hirings may occur without any preceding recruitment activities 
at all, for example, when a job applicant contacts an employer who then decides to 
hire. In this case one might say that ‘supply creates its own demand’ when a properly 
qualified person turns up. And then there is no job vacancy (recruitment process) 
which precedes hiring. 
  Note also that even if a recruitment process precedes a hiring, it can sometimes 
be so short that the distinction between the recruitment process and the hiring is 
negligible. Examples include recalls by phone calls of former employees, or selection 
of casual labourers in a hiring hall at the beginning of a day. And in surveys on job 
vacancies firms may not consider recalls to be recruitment, even if the time between 
job offer and acceptance is long, unless instructed to do so. 
  Hirings with negligible or non-existent recruitment processes before hiring may 
be called instantaneous hirings. Information on such hirings is scarce. But what 
information there is does suggest that not every hiring begins with a job vacancy. 
Consider, for instance, the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP) surveys in   5
the United States in 1980 and 1982.
1 In these surveys employers were asked questions 
about the hiring process for the most recent newly hired person. And in the first 
survey 28 percent responded that they did not recruit for the position. 
  In general we consequently have 
(2)   VH T β = , 
whereβ  denotes the proportion of hirings preceded by job vacancies. Note that this 
formula can be used to estimate the proportion of instantaneous hirings (1 β − ) in a 
labour market, provided, of course, that we have information on not only H and T but 
also V.  
 
2.2. Vacancies without hirings 
Equation (2) presupposes not only a steady state but also that all vacancies end in 
hiring, so that  H β equals the inflow of vacancies. But job vacancies can be cancelled 
by firms before hiring. This can happen simply because the situation has changed, so 
that the firms no longer want to recruit new personnel, or because firms having 
difficulties in forecasting their labour demand realize that they have exaggerated their 
needs.
2 Or some job vacancies may be cancelled because firms realize that no 
recruitment is possible at the moment and that they have to solve their staffing 
problems by other means, for instance, reorganization and training followed by 
posting job vacancies which are easier to fill. 
  Information on cancelled job vacancies is scarce, particularly on firms’ reasons 
for cancelling job vacancies. But some sample surveys by the Public Employment 
Service in Sweden in the beginning of the 1990’s suggest that the proportion of job 
vacancies which end in hiring is very high, and at least equal to 90 percent.
3 Results 
by van Ours and Ridder (1992 p. 145) suggest the same thing. 
  Thus, on one hand, it seems to be approximately true that all job vacancies 
(sooner or later) end in hiring, which is a standard assumption in the search literature,  
                                                 
1 Results from the first wave are reported in Barron, Bishop and Dunkelberg (1985) and results from 
the second wave in Barron and Bishop (1985). 
2 As emphasized by, for instance, Thomson (1966 p. 177). 
3 See Falk (1996).   6
including Pissarides (2000). On the other hand, more information is needed, either to 
corroborate this assumption, which is in stark contrast to the fact that usually almost 
half of unemployment spells end without hiring, or to throw light upon another 
important aspect of friction. 
 
2.3. The relation between hirings and vacancies 
Equation (2) shows how the stock of vacancies (V) adjusts to variations in the inflow 
of vacancies ( H β ) and their average duration (T). And in general both β  and T 
depend on unemployment (as well as other variables characterizing labour supply, 
search efficiency, and institutional factors). 
   Of course, if (2) is a stable empirical relation between vacancies, hirings, and 
unemployment, then 
(3)     ( ) , HVTm V U β ==   
will also appear as a stable empirical relation between hirings, vacancies, and 
unemployment. In the search and matching literature this relation has been interpreted 
as an aggregate matching function, showing how vacancies and unemployment as 
‘inputs’ give rise to ‘output’ in the form of hirings. 
  Equation (3) is a specification which suggests that vacancies – as well as 
unemployment and other variables on the right hand side of (3) – may have direct 
effects on hirings. But hirings are not determined directly by vacancies and 
unemployment. Hirings are determined by firms’ need to replace separations and 
realize changes in employment, conditional on (current and expected) prices, sales 
and costs, including recruitment costs. This is elaborated in Nickel (1986) for 
instantaneous hirings. It remains to see how deviations from instantaneous hirings 
affect hirings and employment. And the first step in this investigation is to develop 
measures of deviations from instantaneous hirings. 
 
3. Defining and measuring friction 
In this section I survey three measures of friction, namely the rate of job vacancies, 
the average duration of recruitment, and the rate of unfilled jobs, and I illustrate these 
measures with data from Sweden since 2000 from a new business survey. 
  If all hirings were instantaneous there would be no vacancies as measured in 
vacancy surveys. We can consequently interpret the vacancy rate as a summary   7
measure of friction in terms of deviations from instantaneous hirings. And the 
vacancy rate is closely related to the U/V curve, which is the classical point of 
departure for the analysis of friction in the labour market   
 
3.1. Job vacancies  
Movements of the UV point in a UV diagram are easy to explain starting from 
equation (2), which says that the stock of vacancies is proportional to the flow of 
hirings. 
  As aggregate demand increases, hirings and vacancies will increase as 
employment (N) increases and unemployment falls, which implies a negative 
relationship between unemployment and vacancies. More precisely, since 
HSN =+ & , where S denotes separations andN &  the growth rate of employment, we 
have 
(4)   ( ) VT S N β =+ & , 
whereN &  is positive during an upswing, when unemployment decreases, and negative 
during a downswing. Thus, during a business cycle the UV point moves counter-
clockwise around an equilibrium locus defined by the equation 
(5)   VT S β = , 
where, in general, not only T β  but also S depends on unemployment. 
  It is useful to distinguish between the observed UV curve, which might be 
called the UV loop, defined by (4), and the equilibrium UV curve, often called the 
Beveridge curve, defined by (5). The negative relationship between vacancies and 
unemployment during a business cycle which is actually observed in a UV diagram is 
always a part of the UV loop. 
  While shifts of the UV loop between business cycles may be due to shifts of the 
level of aggregate demand, shifts of the Beveridge curve reflect structural changes. 
But an outward shift of the Beveridge curve, that is, more vacancies at a given 
unemployment rate, is not necessarily due to longer vacancy spells or fewer 
instantaneous hirings. It may also be due to more separations. 
  Regressions of the vacancy rate on unemployment, employment growth, and 
other relevant variables may show, for instance, that variation in unemployment   8
benefits has a well-defined effect on friction as measured by the vacancy rate. But 
there are better measures. 
 
3.2. Average recruitment times 
Dividing the number of vacancies (V) by the number of hirings per period (H), we 
obtain a measure of the average duration of recruitment. 
 
Table 1   Job vacancies, unfilled jobs, and average recruitment times in Sweden. 























2000 Q3  2550  88.4  69.2  2.7  0.81  1.1 
         Q4  2493  72.2  63.1  2.6  1.05  1.1 
2001 Q1  2504  70.3  57.9  2.3  0.93  1.0 
         Q2  2538  91.8  49.4  2.0  0.58  0.8 
         Q3  2647  83.2  44.7  1.7  0.55  0.7 
         Q4  2574  65.1  38.8  1.5  0.65  0.6 
2002 Q1  2522  61.4  38.4  1.6  0.64  0.6 
         Q2  2573  97.7  39.1  1.6  0.40  0.6 
         Q3  2575  84.1  35.2  1.4  0.43  0.6 
         Q4  2556  72.1  31.9  1.3  0.49  0.5 
2003 Q1  2498  63.6  36.0  1.5  0.61  0.7 
         Q2  2562  99,7  30.6  1.2  0.34  0.4 
         Q3  2563  75.0  26.4  1.0  0.36  0.4 
         Q4  2518  60.3  23.7  0.9  0.39  0.4 
2004 Q1  2458  57.9  25.7  1.0  0.44  0.4 
         Q2  2547  96.2  27.8  1.1  0.29  0.4 
         Q3  2563  73.8  26.8  1.1  0.37  0.4 
 
Notes: Columns 5 and 7 report job vacancies and unfilled jobs as per cent of employment. Column 6 
reports ratio estimates of V/H (not estimates in column 4 divided by estimates in column 3). Standard 
deviations are approximately 0.05 in columns 5 and 7 and at most 0.03 in column 6. 
 
Source: Statistics Sweden (business surveys on employment and vacancies). See SCB (2004a) and 
SCB (2004b) for examples of reports from the quarterly surveys. 
 
  Table 1 reports vacancies and average recruitment times in Sweden since 2000 
according to a new business survey. It confirms the stylized fact that the average 
completed duration of a vacancy is in most cases under a month.
4  
  Note, however, that V/H is a measure of the average duration of all vacancies, 
including ‘vacancies with negligible duration’, like recalls by phone calls of former 
employees. Since such vacancies are not usually measured in vacancy surveys, it is   9
more accurate to say that V/H equals the average duration of vacancies (T) multiplied 
by the proportion of non-instantaneous hirings (β ), since VH T β =  according to 
(2). If, for instance, a separate sample survey on vacancy durations shows that the 
average spell of a (completed) vacancy is 3 months, then the proportion of 
instantaneous hirings (1 β − ) is 2/3 if V/H is equal to 1 month. 
  In general the average duration of recruitment as measured by V/H depends on 
labour supply, search efficiency, and institutional factors. This dependence can be 
characterized by a duration function, where the independent variables include not 
only unemployment but also other relevant variables. 
  Estimation of the duration function is an important first step in the analysis of 
the effect of friction on employment. But it remains to find out how recruitment times 
affect employment. 
 
3.3. Unfilled jobs  
Note first that the fact that it takes time to recruit workers does not necessarily reduce 
employment. For, as emphasized by Holt and David (1966 p. 82), firms create 
vacancies in anticipation of future needs. If, for instance, a separation can be 
anticipated and a replacement made before the separation, then replacement is 
instantaneous even if recruitment is not. Otherwise an unfilled job exists from the day 
the employer wants the worker to start to the day the worker starts. 
  The number of unfilled jobs is a measure of the direct effect of friction on 
employment. More precisely, as elaborated in section 5, the time it takes to recruit 
workers reduces employment by making the number of filled jobs (employees) less 
than the number of jobs. And the difference is the number of unfilled jobs. 
  It is sometimes assumed (for simplicity in theoretical models) that every 
separation gives rise to an unfilled job, or that firms have to create unfilled jobs in 
order to recruit workers.
5 But, as noted above, many separations are anticipated and 
replacements made before the corresponding jobs become unfilled. This applies 
particularly to large firms.
6 
                                                                                                                                            
4 See, for instance, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001 p. 421). 
5 See, for instance, Pissarides (2000 p. 5), where it is assumed that ‘only vacant jobs can engage in 
trade’. 
6 As emphasized, for instance, by van Ours and Ridder (1992 p. 140).   10
  In fact, according to the Swedish vacancy survey, which measures not only job 
vacancies but also unfilled jobs, only about 40 per cent of the job vacancies are 
unfilled jobs, as shown by Table 1. 
  Unfilled jobs are defined more precisely as unoccupied job vacancies which are 
available immediately in the Swedish vacancy survey. This is a definition which 
excludes occupied job vacancies and job vacancies to be filled later, in the same way 
as the definition of unemployed workers in labour force surveys excludes job seekers 
with a job and job seekers without a job who cannot start work until later.
7 
 
4. Indirect effects of recruitment costs on hirings and employment 
A formal analysis of the effect on hirings of vacancies is in general complex, as is 
easily seen by adding the number of vacancies as a control variable to the already 
complex analysis in Nickel (1986). But it is reasonable to assume that the order of 
magnitude of the effects of vacancies on hirings is captured by an equilibrium 
analysis. And then we can ignore hirings which realize the firm’s desired net change 
of employment – including the complex dependence on expectations – and focus on 
those hirings which replace separations. 
    In general separations – and hence also hirings – depend not only on 
employment but also on the state of the labour market, as measured, for instance, by 
the unemployment rate, and on structural factors, including, in particular, the share of 
temporary jobs, as emphasized by, for instance, Verhage et al. (1987 p. 17). But we 
shall here focus on the dependence on employment. Moreover, vacancies can 
influence a firm’s separations either by affecting its number of employees or its 
separation rate. Assuming, as a first approximation, that the effect of vacancies on the 
separation rate is negligible compared to their effect on the number of employees, we 
shall here focus on effects of vacancies on the number of employees and therefore 
postulate a constant separation rate. 
 
4.1. Assumptions 
In equilibrium with recruitment costs a firm's flow of profits is  
                                                 
7 The definition and measurement of unfilled jobs in the Swedish vacancy survey is explained in more 
detail in Appendix 1. 
   11
(6)   ( ) R Nw N HV π αγ =− − − , 
where R denotes the firm’s (net) revenue function, N its employment, H its number of 
hirings per period, and V its number of job vacancies. The wage level is denoted by w 
and recruitment costs are captured by the parametersα , as in Nickell (1986), and γ , 
as in Pissarides (2000). For simplicity we ignore firing costs. 
  Recruitment costs are in general composed of both hiring costs (α  per hiring) 
and vacancy costs (γ  per vacancy and period). We incorporate both hiring costs and 
vacancy costs in the model because, as we shall see in Section 4.4, not only the size 
but also the structure of recruitment costs matter. 
  Next we introduce a fundamental assumption in job matching theory, namely 
that the flow of a firm’s hirings is proportional to its recruitment efforts as measured 
by its stock of vacancies, 
(7)   Hq V = , 
where, in general, q depends on the state of the labour market. Thus, in contrast to 
Nickel (1986), where all hirings are instantaneous, we assume here that a firm has to 
generate vacancies (start recruitment processes) to obtain new employees, so that no 
hirings are instantaneous, as in Pissarides (2000). 
  The constant of proportionality q in (7) can be interpreted as the probability per 
week that one of the V vacancies leads to a hiring, so that the waiting time has an 
exponential distribution with expected value equal to 1 q  weeks. Of course, in a 
stochastic environment such a direct link between the stock of vacancies and the flow 
of hirings as in (7) can only apply to a large firm exploiting the law of large numbers, 
as emphasized by Pissarides (2000 p. 68), or to a large group of (small) firms. 
  We shall analyze the effect of recruitment costs on employment on the 
assumption that firms take the wage level w as given when prices are set or, more 
precisely, as unaffected by vacancy costs. This is hardly restrictive, but note that if 
wages are reduced as a compensation for higher vacancy costs, then the effect of 
longer recruitment times on employment will be less than it is in the following 
analysis.     
 
4.2. Profit maximization with recruitment costs    12
In a steady state we haveHs N = , where s denotes the (constant) separation rate, and 
substituting this expression and VH qs N q = =  into (6) we obtain 
(8)   () ( ) R Nw N q s N πα γ =− − + . 
Next we use the simple economic principles in Nickel (1986 p. 481) and argue as 
follows. According to (8) a unit increase in employment generates additional costs of 
() wq s αγ ++  per period in equilibrium. But in order to obtain a new employee the 
firm also has to generate a vacancy for 1 q weeks (on the average). A unit increase in 
employment consequently also involves a once for all cost of q α γ + , or, 
equivalently, a flow cost of  () rq αγ +  per period, where r is the interest rate. It 
follows that 
(9)   ( ) () ( ) R Nw r s q αγ ′ =++ +  
in equilibrium for a profit-maximizing firm. 
 
4.3. Employment and prices 
As emphasized by Layard, Nickel, and Jackman (1991 p. 341) for a non-competitive 
firm without recruitment costs, equation (9) is an equilibrium relationship: “It is not a 
labour demand function because prices are chosen jointly with employment”. This is 
also true for a representative competitive firm. For, with ( )( ) R Np G N = , where G 
denotes the production function and p the market price, condition (9) reduces to 
(10)   () ( )( ) pGN w rs q αγ ′ =++ + , 
and assuming that the firm is one of n identical firms in a competitive industry, the 
market price and a firm’s employment are determined by equation (10) and the 
equation 
(11)   ( ) ( ) nG N D p = , 
where  () D ⋅  is the industry’s product-demand function. 
  Pissarides (2000) assumes that the marginal product of labour is constant. But 
then it is particularly clear that equation (10) should be interpreted not as a marginal 
productivity condition for employment, as in Pissarides (2000), but as a price 
equation. For, if  () GN a ′ = , equation (10) can be written as 
(12)   ( )( ) () p wr s qa αγ =+ + + .   13
  As emphasized by Pissarides elsewhere, in Pissarides (1984 p. 133), an equation 
like (10) with  () GN a ′ =  is basically a modification of the classical condition on 
wages under constant returns to scale. The marginal product of labour (a) exceeds the 
real wage (wp ) because firms need to cover their recruitment costs. And in 
equilibrium in a competitive economy prices adjust to marginal costs, including 
recruitment costs. 
  It follows from (10) and (11) that higher recruitment costs reduce employment 
by reducing sales through higher prices (in accordance with the principle of derived 
demand). Note, in particular, that the magnitude of the effect of recruitment costs on 
employment depends on how important recruitment costs are for price setting. 
  When calculating the price of a product, a firm calculates all the required inputs 
at input prices. And from (12) it follows that if it takes h hours to make a product, 
then this will add  () 1 wm h +  to its price, where the mark-up m is given by  





  If, for example, w = 360 000 SEK per year, r = 3 per cent per year, s = 36 per 
cent per year,  100000 α =  SEK per hire (including the cost of introduction and 
training of a new employee),  10000 γ =  SEK per week, and 14 q =  weeks, then 
0.152 m = . When calculating the cost of a product’s labour input, the firm will 
consequently apply a mark-up equal to 15.2 per cent to the basic wage rate. And the 
contribution of the vacancy cost γ  to this mark-up is 4.3 per cent. 
 
4.4. The structure of recruitment costs 
The effect of longer recruitment times on employment through the mark-up m 
depends on the distribution of recruitment costs between hiring costs α  and vacancy 
costsγ , according to (13). 
  The structure of recruitment costs depends on the search strategy used by firms. 
This question has been addressed by, for instance, van Ours and Ridder (1992). Using 
vacancy data from the Netherlands they conclude that employer search is mostly non-
sequential. Almost all applicants arrive during the first two weeks after the 
announcement of a vacancy, which suggests that resources spent on job advertising in 
most cases are concentrated to the beginning of the recruitment process. Hence these   14
costs do not depend on the duration of the vacancy and are consequently part of the 
hiring cost α . The same is true if the firm is using a private employment agency and 
is paying the agency for its services per job match. 
  On the other hand, increasing recruitment times as measured by V/H may be due 
to a decreasing share of instantaneous hirings. This may imply a shift from 
instantaneous hirings with  0 α =  towards more costly search for job applicants with 
0 α > .  Thus, even if the recruitment mark-up m is independent of the vacancy 
duration for hirings preceded by vacancies, it may increase discontinuously for other 
hirings, implying a higher mark-up on the average. 
      During recruitment of replacements firms sometimes experience unfilled jobs. 
Does this also mean that the (opportunity) cost of unfilled jobs should be included as 
vacancy costs which affect the mark-up in (13)? 
  The answer is ‘no’, for the following reasons. 
  Recruitment activities comprise efforts to attract job applicants followed by 
selection. Equation (6) does not model the choice between different methods of 
recruitment, only the effect on employment of choosing costly recruitment. But an 
implicit assumption of this model is, of course, that firms only use methods of 
recruitment which are consistent with profit-maximizing behaviour. And such 
methods cannot include unfilled jobs, since having unfilled jobs (‘idle machines’) 
does not in itself attract job applicants. 
  In fact, equation (6) already excludes unfilled jobs, at least unfilled jobs defined 
as ‘dips in employment’ as elaborated in Section 5, because employment is assumed 
to be constant over time in (6). In other words, this section deals with the effect on 
employment of costly search on the simplifying assumption that firms completely 
control employment. 
  This may be a reasonable approach if unfilled jobs are rare and hard to predict, 
so that firms simply ignore them when prices are adjusted to recruitment costs. The 
approach may also be reasonable for employers who anticipate problems to keep 
employment constant, provided it also incorporates plans to use substitutes (including 
personnel from temporary work agencies) whenever substitutes are necessary during 
recruitment of replacements in order to avoid ‘dips in employment’. Of course, this 
also means that anticipated costs of the necessary substitutes must be added to 
vacancy costs. But note that only vacancy costs above the wage level w can be   15
included, since the term wN in (6) already includes the basic costs of having posts 
occupied. 
 
4.5. Hirings and vacancies 
A firm stabilizes employment at its equilibrium level N by generating hirings at the 
rate of  
(14)   Hs N = . 
This is done by adjustment of the stock of vacancies according to (7) so that 
(15)  Vs N q = . 
  Adjustment to equilibrium can be instantaneous if V is assumed to be a choice 
variable (as in Pissarides 2000). Otherwise adjustment will be gradual. A firm that 
wishes to hire at the rate of sN announces new vacancies at the rate of sN. If qV sN <  
the vacancy stock V will grow untilqV sN =  and if qV sN >  the stock will decline 
untilqV sN = .  
  Equations (14) and (15) for a firm, or a group of firms, show how hirings and 
vacancies adjust to variations in employment in equilibrium. It also shows that a 
change in q will change the number of vacancies. Hirings are affected only if 
employment is affected, and employment is affected only if the average duration of 
vacancies (1 q) affects employment by affecting recruitment costs. 








where  () uUNU =+  and  VU θ =  (where U is unemployment), and interprets the 
result as “an equation determining unemployment in terms of the two transition 
rates”. This is an interpretation – in the Markovian framework we are accustomed to 
and seldom question – which suggests that a decline in q will raise unemployment, 
other things being equal. But other things will not be equal. Longer vacancy spells 
will increase the stock of vacancies and keep employment and hirings stable – unless 
higher recruitment costs reduce employment. 
  In this section we have studied indirect effects of longer recruitment times on 
employment through higher recruitment costs. We now turn to the study of direct   16
effects of longer recruitment times on employment, effects which exist even when 
vacancy costs are negligible ( 0 γ = ).   
 
5. Direct effects of unfilled jobs on employment 
So far we have assumed that a firm can keep its employment constant over time in a 
static environment. But a firm cannot in general avoid random fluctuations in its 
employment. These fluctuations in employment are mirrored by fluctuations in 
unfilled jobs. And these unfilled jobs exist because firms cannot always anticipate 
their need for new hires in time, and because it takes time to recruit personnel. 
  Fundamental to the following approach to unfilled jobs is the distinction 
between jobs and employment and the assumption that a firm does not choose its 
employment (or its unfilled jobs) but its jobs. For a chosen number of jobs (D), 
unfilled jobs (V) and employment (ND V = − ) will fluctuate in a way which a firm 
cannot predict or control with certainty, even if it tries to avoid having unfilled jobs 
(and thus dips in employment) by appropriate recruitment activities. 
  More precisely, suppose first that hiring is instantaneous even if it is costly. 
Then a firm would choose a certain employment level F in equilibrium (according to 
the analysis in Section 4, with all recruitment costs captured byα ). And employment 
would be constant over time in a static environment. 
  In general, however, a firm’s employment level cannot always be kept constant, 
because separations cannot always be replaced instantaneously. In this case the firm 
cannot choose its employment path with certainty. Instead it has to choose an 
employment strategy. And assuming risk neutrality the firm’s problem is to find an 
employment strategy which maximises its expected profits. 
  It is reasonable to assume that an optimal employment strategy for a firm in a 
static environment is to hire a certain number of workers (D), and then start recruiting 
every time a separation is anticipated, even if we cannot assume a priori thatDF = . 
At any point in time, D will be equal to the sum of the number of filled jobs N 
(‘satisfied labour demand’) and the number of unfilled jobs V (‘unsatisfied labour 
demand’), suggesting, first, that we define the firm’s labour demand (or its number of 
jobs) as the employment strategy D, and, second, that this strategy can be observed as 
the sum of N and V. A formal model of a firm’s decision problem in this case is 
presented in Appendix 2.   17
  An equivalent definition of labour demand is that the number of jobs in a firm 
with N workers is equal to D if the firm is ready to employ DN −  properly qualified 
persons if they turn up. This is essentially the same as the definition of ‘established 
posts’ in Layard et al. (1991 p. 273), where the number of ‘established posts’ in a firm 
is equal to P if the firm will ‘advertise’ PN −  jobs when it has N workers. And the 
definitions are exactly the same if we assume, as Layard et al. (1991 p. 273) do, that 
“(i)f a firm advertises y vacancies, it must be ready to employ y (properly qualified) 
people if they turn up”. 
  A firm which expects that it cannot keep employment constant at F but 
experiences random ‘dips in employment’ (that is, unfilled jobs) from time to time, 
may find it profitable to increase its number of jobs and chooseDF > . This problem 
of ‘genuine’ vacancies was first addressed by Jackman, Layard, and Pissarides (1989 
p. 378) and further discussed by Layard, Nickel, and Jackman (1991 p. 273), who 
argue that “firms might find it worth their while to declare more vacancies than they 
have productive jobs, if they expect that on average they will not be able to fill all 
their vacancies. Against this is the risk that they may then have to hire more people 
than they want, if people turn up.” 
  But ‘declare vacancies’ must not be interpreted literally in this context. A large 
firm which hires new personnel regularly, for instance, may be able to select 
personnel from a spontaneous flow of job applicants without having to formally 
‘declare’ or announce any vacancies at all. And if the firm finds a spontaneous flow 
inadequate, it may attempt to increase the flow by advertising its needs in general 
terms, without specifying the number of job applicants that will eventually be hired. 
  The point is that if a firm has DN −  unfilled jobs, it is ready to employ DN −  
properly qualified people if they turn up, irrespective of the design of its recruitment 
activities. For, unless the firm hires such people, it will not maximise expected 
profits. 
  Friction reduces the average number of employees by the average number of 
unfilled jobs ifDF = . But a gap between a firm’s number of jobs and its average 
number of employees does not necessarily mean that friction reduces average 
employment in equilibrium. For, in equilibrium a firm should be able to anticipate 
such a gap, and then the firm can choose to increase its number of jobs to compensate 
for the gap, so thatDF > . In this case friction would consequently increase not only   18
the gap between the number of jobs and the average number of employees but also the 
number of jobs. 
  Layard et al. (1991 p. 274) derive a condition for when it is unprofitable for a 
firm to have an extra post ( 1 DF =+  instead ofDF = ) and find that this condition is 
satisfied for most firms.  Moreover, this condition is almost the same as the condition 
for choosingDF = in the model presented in Appendix 2. 
  Thus, we can assume that firms do not react to friction in the hiring process by 
increasing the number of jobs. It follows that the average number of unfilled jobs can 
be interpreted as a reduction of average employment caused by friction. 
 
6. Conclusions  
Large shifts of the matching function may indicate large changes in search efficiency, 
which have large effects on hirings and employment. But the effects of shifts of the 
matching function on hirings and employment cannot be estimated directly from 
regressions with hirings as the dependent variable. For what the relation between 
hirings, vacancies, and unemployment really shows is how recruitment times adjust to 
variations in labour supply and search efficiency. It follows that the proper 
specification of the relation between hirings (H), vacancies (V), and unemployment is 
the duration function, which shows how average recruitment times as measured by 
V/H depend on unemployment and other relevant variables. 
  Estimation of the duration function will show what factors which influence 
recruitment times and how large the effects are. This is an important first step. But 
how will variation in recruitment times affect employment? 
  We have seen that longer recruitment times may reduce employment if they 
increase recruitment costs so much that prices are raised and sales reduced so much 
that employment is also reduced. There is no information on this issue I am aware of. 
But if asked how variation in recruitment times will affect pricing (or employment), 
an employer might well answer that the effect is negligible. 
  On the other hand, longer recruitment times may also increase the risk of 
unfilled jobs. And unfilled jobs will reduce employment by creating a gap between 
the number of jobs and average employment. Moreover, the determinants of this gap 
may be identified by estimating a regression of the rate of unfilled jobs on 
unemployment and other relevant variables (including unemployment benefits). But   19
this, of course, requires vacancy surveys which measure not only job vacancies but 
also unfilled jobs. 
   20
Appendix 1. Defining and measuring unfilled jobs 
Measurement of unfilled jobs in enterprise surveys presupposes an operational 
definition in terms of specific questions to firms (or establishments). An example of a 
questionnaire designed to measure not only the number of job vacancies but also the 
number of unfilled jobs is presented in Figure 1. The example is taken from the 
Swedish vacancy survey, which started in July 2000, and which since January 2001 
covers not only the private but also the public sector. It is statutory since July 2003. 
  The questionnaire in Figure 1 measures unfilled jobs defined as unoccupied job 
openings which are available immediately. It combines two basic principles. First, a 
direct question about the number of job openings is asked, as in the Dutch vacancy 
survey.
8 This approach rests on the assumption that employers interpret ’job 
openings’ as ‘job vacancies’ are defined in Section 2, particularly if a brief definition 
is given, as in Figure 1.
9 Second, unfilled jobs are measured indirectly, as 
unemployed workers are measured in labour force surveys, by a sequence of 
questions. 
  Thus, after the first question on the total number of job openings, questions are 
asked about how many of these job openings which are occupied on the reference day 
by retiring workers or substitutes or personnel from a temporary employment agency, 
and then those job openings which are not occupied are divided between ‘future’ and 
‘current’ unoccupied job openings. Unfilled jobs are defined operationally as a subset 
of job openings obtained by eliminating first ’occupied job openings’ and then ’future 
unoccupied job openings’, defined more precisely as ‘unoccupied job openings which 
on the reference day are unoccupied because no work is wanted or planned until after 
the reference day’. The job openings which remain after these eliminations are 
‘unoccupied job openings which are available immediately’. 
  ‘Occupied job openings’ exist when, during recruitment of new workers, the 
corresponding jobs are occupied by retiring workers or substitutes until replacements 
or permanent personnel have been hired. Job openings which are occupied by retiring 
workers reflect employers’ ability to anticipate their need for new hires and certainly 
not ‘unsatisfied labour demand’. But job openings occupied by substitutes cannot 
                                                 
8 See Van Bastelaer and Laan (1994) for a detailed presentation of the Dutch vacancy survey, 
including its questionnaires.   21
represent completely satisfied labour demand, since the firms would not be recruiting 
new personnel if they did. On the other hand, workers with temporary employment 
who are looking for new jobs are not classified as unemployed, so a measure of unmet 
demand which corresponds to the usual measure of unmet supply should not include 




Figure 1. The questionnaire in the Swedish vacancy survey 
 
 
1  JOB OPENINGS 
 
Total number of job openings on the reference day: …… 
 
A job is open if the employer has started to recruit a new worker from outside the firm on or  
before the reference day but has not yet hired one. During recruitment of new workers the 
corresponding jobs may be occupied or unoccupied according to the following questions. 
  
 
2  JOB OPENINGS WHICH ARE OCCUPIED 
 
a) Number of job openings which on the reference day are occupied by retiring workers who 
have not yet left the employer: …… 
 
b) Number of job openings which on the reference day are occupied by substitutes or other 
temporary workers: …… 
 
c) Number of job openings which on the reference day are occupied by consultants or 
personnel from a temporary employment agency: …… 
 
 
3  JOB OPENINGS WHICH ARE UNOCCUPIED 
 
a) Total number of unoccupied job openings: …… 
 
b) Number of these unoccupied job openings which on the reference day are unoccupied 
because no work is wanted or planned until after the reference day: …… 
 
 
Note:  Unfilled jobs (unmet labour demand) are operationally defined as a subset of job openings 
obtained by eliminating first occupied job openings (1 – 2 = 3a) and then job openings which are not 
available until some time in the future (3a – 3b). 
                                                                                                                                            
9 Since a ‘vacancy’ is an ambiguous term (which sometimes is interpreted as an unfilled job) it is wise 
to avoid it altogether in a business survey.   
10 See Farm (2003) for a more detailed discussion of the problem of defining and measuring unmet 
labour demand.    22
Appendix 2. Choosing the number of jobs in a stochastic environment 
Consider a non-competitive or competitive firm in a model with one input and 
constant returns to labour (a). With instantaneous hiring the firm would simply adjust 
its production and employment to its sales (at the price p determined by the firm or 
the market) and replace separations instantaneously. Let F denote its optimal 
employment in this case. Then its profits per period are given by( ) yw F − , where y 
denotes (constant) revenues per period and worker ( yp a = ) and w denotes the 
(constant) wage rate. 
  In general, however, a firm cannot instantaneously control its employment. 
Assuming that the firm cannot change its price during random fluctuations of its 
employment, its maximal sales are given by aF . If employment is less than F the 
firm will consequently loose sales and profits. If it is greater than F the firm will 
either produce more than it can sell or have idle (and costly) capacity. More precisely 
we assume that output cannot be stored, so that the firm’s profits per period are given 
by 
(1)   ( ) yw N π =−  if  NF ≤ , 
(2)   yF wN π =−  if  NF > , 
where N denotes the firm’s employment, 
(3)   12 ... D NNN N = ++ +, 
where 1 j N =  if job j is filled and  0 j N =  if it is unfilled. 
  Assuming that a filled job becomes unfilled with probability ρ  per period, 
while an unfilled job gets filled with probability σ  per period, and assuming in 
addition that { } j N  are independent, N is a random variable with a binomial 
distribution with parameters D and 1 v − , where 





    
can be interpreted as the firm’s vacancy rate, since  ( ) ( ) EV D EN D v =− = . 
  Obviously it will never be optimal for the firm to choose DF < . Moreover, if 
DF =  then NF ≤  and  () yw N π =− . It follows that the firm’s expected profits are 
(5)   ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) 1 E y wEN y wF v π =− =− −   if DF = . 
Next we note that if  1 DF =+ then   23
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y w kP N k yP N F
+
=
=− = − = + = ∑  
   () ( ) ( )() () ( ) ( )
11 11 1 1
FF yw E N y v ywF v y v
+ + = − −− = − +− −− . 
Hence it will be unprofitable to have one extra post if 
(7)   ( ) ( ) () () ( ) ()
1 11 1 1
F ywF v y v yw F v
+ − +− −− < − − , 
or, equivalently, if 
(8)   () 11
F wy v −< − , 
which is the same condition as in Layard et al. (1991 p. 274). 
  But the argument does not prove formally that more than one extra post is also 
unprofitable if (8) is true. However, if v is small the right hand side is approximately 






and it is at least possible to prove formally that 




< .    
  To prove (10) we begin by noting that since  yF wN π ≤ −  for every N and 
yF wN π <− if NF <  we have 
   ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 Ey F w E N y F w D v π <− =− −  if DF > . 
Hence () ( ) D FD F EE ππ
>= <  if 
   ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 yF wD v y w F v −− < − − , 
or if 
   ( )( ) 1 vyF w D F v < −− . 
And this inequality is obviously true for every DF >  if it is true for  1 DF =+ , that 
is, if 
   ( ) 1 vyF w v < − , 
which is equivalent to (10).   24
References 
 
Abraham, K. 1983. ‘Structural/Frictional vs. Deficient Demand Unemployment: 
Some New Evidence’, American Economic Review, 73, 708-724. 
 
Abraham, K. 1987. ‘Help-Wanted Advertising, Job Vacancies, and Unemployment’, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1987, 207-248. 
 
Blanchard, O.J. and Diamond, P. 1989. ‘The Beveridge Curve’, Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, 1:1989, 1-76. 
 
Barron, J.M. and Bishop, J. 1985. ‘Extensive Search, Intensive Search, and Hiring 
Costs: New Evidence on Employer Hiring Activity’, Economic Inquiry, 23, 363-382. 
 
Barron, J.M., Bishop, J. and Dunkelberg, W.C. 1985. ‘Employer Search: The 
Interviewing and Hiring of New Employees’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 67, 
43-52. 
 
Burdett, K. and Cunningham, E.J. 1998. ‘Toward a Theory of Vacancies’, Journal of 
Labor Economics, 16, 445-478. 
 
Devine, T.J. and Kiefer, N.M. 1991. Empirical Labor Economics. The Search 
Approach, Oxford University Press. 
 
Dow, J.C.R. and Dicks-Mireaux, L.A 1958. ‘The Excess Demand for Labour’, Oxford 
Economic Papers, 10, 1-33. 
 
Falk, K. 1996. ‘1995 års uppföljning av avrapporterade platser’ (The follow-up of 
cancelled job orders in 1995), Pfuu 1996:2, AMS (National Labour Market Board). 
 
Farm, A. 2003. ‘Defining and Measuring Unmet Labour Demand’, Working Paper 
1/2003, SOFI, Stockholm University. 
 
Hamermesh, D. 1993. Labor Demand, Princeton University Press. 
 
Holt, C.C. and David, M.H. 1966. ‘The Concept of Job Vacancies in a Dynamic 
Theory of the Labor Market’, in NBER (ed.), The Measurement and Interpretation of 
Job Vacancies, Colombia University Press. 
 
Jackman, R., Layard, R. and Pissarides, C. 1989. ‘On Vacancies’, Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 51, 377-394. 
 
Layard, R., Nickell, S. and Jackman, R. 1991. Unemployment. Macroeconomic 
Performance and the Labour Market, Oxford University Press. 
 
Muysken, J. (ed.) 1994. Measurement and Analysis of Job Vacancies, Avebury. 
 
NBER (ed.) 1966. The Measurement and Interpretation of Job Vacancies, Colombia 
University Press.   25
 
Nickell, S.J. 1986 ‘Dynamic Models of Labour Demand’, in Ashenfelter, O. and 
Layard, R. (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, North-Holland. 
 
Petrongolo, B. and Pissarides, C.A. 2001. ‘Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of 
the Matching Function’, Journal of Economic Literature, 39, 390-431. 
 
Pissarides, C.A. 1984. ‘Search Intensity, Job Advertising, and Efficiency’, Journal of 
Labor Economics, 2, 128-143. 
 
Pissarides, C.P. 1986. ‘Unemployment and Vacancies in Britain’, Economic Policy, 3, 
499-559.  
 
Pissarides, C.A. 2000. Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, second edition, MIT 
Press. 
 
SCB 2004a. Kortperiodisk sysselsättningsstatistik 2:a kvartalet 2004 (Short-term 
employment 2nd quarter of 2004), Statistics Sweden (http://www.scb.se). 
 
SCB 2004b. Konjunkturstatistik över vakanser. Lediga jobb och brist på arbetskraft, 
resultat från 2:a kvartalet 2004 (Job openings and unmet labour demand, results from 
the 2nd quarter of 2004), Statistics Sweden (http://www.scb.se). 
 
Thomson, W. 1966. ‘Collection and Use of Job Vacancy Data in Canada’, in NBER 
(ed.), The Measurement and Interpretation of Job Vacancies, Colombia University 
Press. 
 
Van Bastelaer, A. and Laan, J. 1994. ‘The Job Vacancy Survey in the Netherlands’, in 
Muysken, J. (ed.), Measurement and Analysis of Job Vacancies, Avebury. 
 
van Ours, J.C. and Ridder, G. 1992. ‘Vacancies and the Recruitment of New 
Employees’, Journal of Labor Economics, 10, 138-155. 
 
Verhage, K.G., van Nes, P.J., and van der Weijde, I. 1997. Employment market 
analysis, Netherlands Economic Institute. 
 